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Jurisdictional Reform in California
By MILTON D. GREEN*
PROCEDURAL reform has traditionally been accomplished in
either of two ways. One is the piecemeal method, by which a little
change is made here and another there, to take care of minor defects
in the system. To an extent this method is evident everywhere; but
since the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been the ex-
clusive method of modification in California. The other manner of
reform is to make a sweeping revision, wiping out everything and, in
effect, starting anew. This second method was utilized both for the
first Codes, and the new Rules of Civil Procedure. Both the piece-
meal method and the sweeping reform have their shortcomings. One
of the faults of the piecemeal method is that an amendment to a spe-
cific section of a code may have unexpected side-effects elsewhere.'
One of the defects of the wholesale method is that the newly enacted
system, like an organ transplant, may encounter rejection symptoms
on the part of the bar or the courts, with the result that the cure sought
by the reform is only partially accomplished.2
Procedure is inherently specific. Under the adversary theory of
justice the rules of procedure are the rules of the game. Each party
may or must do certain things and if he violates the rules, he may incur
certain penalties. While the rules may be changed, by piecemeal or
wholesale, the new rules must also be specific. We may change the
time to answer from 20 to 30 days, abolish demurrers and substitute
motions to dismiss; we may do many things in the name of procedural
reform, but the new product must be specific. The parties must know
what is expected of them. This requirement of specificity is traditional.
A new, more flexible method may be emerging. It might be
called the open-end method, or trend adoption, for it ties reform to a
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Green, Procedural Progress in Washington, 26 WASH. L. REV. 87, 113-15
(1951).
2. See C. CLA , CODE PLEADiNG 246-47 (1947); J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COM-
MON LAw PLEADING 21-23 (1969).
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national trend and is somewhat analogous to an escalator clause in a
collective bargaining agreement.3 California has just embraced this
method by amending its Code of Civil Procedure to include the following
clause:
A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.
4
A masterpiece of brevity, this cryptic sentence contains few clues
to its meaning or its purpose. The reference to the California and
Federal Constitutions serves as little more than a point of departure
in any inquiry. Clearly, some reference must be made to the authori-
ties interpreting the constitutional language that bears on the permis-
sible extent of state court jurisdiction. An analysis of these authorities
will reveal that during the last several decades, the constitutional limits
of this jurisdiction have been constantly expanding.5 Since the newly
adopted amendment to the California Code of Civil Procedure ties in
with this trend, the future boundaries of California jurisdiction can
only be determined by a careful examination of it.
Background
A bit of background is in order. Judicial jurisdiction is the power
of a court to hear and determine a controversy and render a judgment
which will be accorded respect not only in the state of the forum that
rendered it, but also in other states. The nature of this power has been
the subject of countless judicial opinions and commentaries.6  It
would seem wise, therefore, to attempt a definition of terms at the out-
set. In personam jurisdiction is the authority or power of a court to ad-
judicate the personal legal rights of parties properly brought before it.
Traditional analysis divides in personam jurisdiction into jurisdiction
over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the parties. The former
3. These clauses provide wage increases proportionate to any increase in the
cost of living.
4. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 410.10 (operative July 1, 1970).
5. See generally Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30
RocKY MT. L. REv. 285 (1958); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Role of Personal Jurisdic-
tion: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241; von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121
(1966); Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAiv. L. REv. 909
(1960).
6. E.g., H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 67-79 (4th ed. 1964);
F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE §§ 12.1-.9 (1965); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLicTs LAW
§§ 19-29 (1968).
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refers to the type of case or controversy before the court. Historically,
different courts were created to handle different types of cases. The
common law courts handled only common law cases; the chancery
courts handled only equity cases; and there were other special courts
vested with limited judicial power. The sovereign determined how to
apportion judicial power. It could create courts with exclusive criminal
jurisdiction, exclusive probate jurisdiction, general civil jurisdiction, or
pecuniary limitations. The issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of a
court is whether the sovereign has vested the particular court with power
to handle the particular type of case.
Only if this question is answered in the affirmative is it necessary
to move on to the next or second aspect of in personam jurisdiction,
namely, whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the parties.
This latter aspect of jurisdiction is purely implementary of the subject
matter jurisdiction. In order to be bound by the judgment of a court,
the parties must be properly before it--either by some form of author-
ized legal process or by consenting in some manner recognized by the
law.
In rem jurisdiction, as the name suggests, deals with the power
of a court to deal with a thing. It differs from in personam jurisdiction
in only one important respect: jurisdiction over the parties is not re-
quired. Obviously, since the court is dealing with a thing, there are no
parties, and the judgment will bind the whole world if there is proper
subject matter jurisdiction. True in rem jurisdiction involves a proceed-
ing against a thing, to determine its status as against the legal rights of all
individuals wherever situated, whether known or unknown. Every sov-
ereign may exercise this type of jurisdiction over property within its
borders. The principal questions that have arisen concerning in rem
jurisdiction are (a) whether the sovereign has vested the particular
court with that particular type of power, and (b) whether proper pro-
cedural steps have been taken to invoke the jurisdiction. Invoking the
jurisdiction customarily involves judicial seizure (attachment) of the
property along with notice complying with the requirements of due
process. True in rem actions are relatively rare. The most common
examples are proceedings in admiralty to libel a ship, registrations of
land titles under a Torrens system, proceedings in probate, and pro-
ceedings for the forfeiture of things involved in violation of the criminal
or revenue laws.7
7. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 32, comment a at 128 (1942).
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Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
Quasi in rem jurisdiction, really merely a limited form of in rem
jurisdiction, differs from it in that quasi in rem jurisdiction does not
purport to bind the whole world, but modestly restricts itself to the
named parties to the proceeding. As to them, it does no more than
determine their legal rights in relation to the property before the court.
There are two means of acquiring quasi in rem jurisdiction, attachment
and garnishment. s Both were unknown to the common law, but statutes
in all states authorize both of them. Attachment is described by the Re-
statement as follows:
A court by proper service of process may acquire jurisdiction to
apply to the satisfaction of a claim interests in things subject to
the jurisdiction of the court belonging to the person against whom
the claim is asserted, although the court has no jurisdiction over
him. 9
Attachment is best illustrated by example. A is a resident of
State X. He has a claim against B, who lives in State Y. A would like
to sue B on the claim in State X, but there is no basis by which in per-
sonam jurisdiction over him may be obtained. However, A discovers
that B owns a piece of property in State X. A may proceed against the
property quasi in rem by attaching the land. The mechanics differ
slightly from state to state, but A usually must prepare and file his
complaint, stating his cause of action against B, prepare and file an
affidavit of attachment alleging one of the statutory grounds for attach-
ment (nonresidence of the defendant is usually a sufficient ground),
execute and file a surety bond guaranteeing the payment of damages
in case it turns out the attachment was unwarranted or illegal, and pay
the required docket fees. The writ of attachment will then issue. The
sheriff will thereupon execute it by seizing the property."0 Statutory
notice (usually by mail or publication) must be given to B. If all of
these steps are properly taken, the court has acquired quasi in rem
8. It should be noted that where the plaintiff asserts an interest in property
and seeks to have this interest established against a designated party, the proceeding is
quasi in rem. Examples of such actions would be "actions to recover possession of
land or to establish title to land, such as an ejectment, or one to quiet title or to re-
move a cloud on title, where the court has jurisdiction to give the relief asked because
of its power over the land, even though it has no power over the adverse claimant. Of
the same type is an action to foreclose a mortgage." Id.
9. Id. § 34.
10. Tangible personal property, for example, an automobile, may be physically
seized by the sheriff and taken to the county garage; in the case of real property the
"seizure" is necessarily constructive and usually consists of posting a notice on the
property and filing a document with the clerk and recorder stating that the property
has been attached. E.g. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 542.
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jurisdiction over the property.
Garnishment is almost identical to attachment. The difference
between the two is that garnishment deals with intangible property
while attachment is made only on tangibles. The Restatement describes
garnishment as follows:
A court by proper service of process may acquire jurisdiction to
apply to the satisfaction of a claim an obligation owing to the
person against whom the claim is asserted, if the court has jurisdic-
tion over the obligor, although it has not [sic] jurisdiction over the
person against whom the claim is asserted.'1
The concept of in rem jurisdiction is simple to grasp if the discus-
sion is restricted to tangible property, real or personal. If such property
is physically present within the territorial boundaries of a state, it is
subject to the sovereign power of the state. It may be seized, con-
demned, or sold, and the only serious questions that arise relate to the
mechanics of the exercise of jurisdiction. Is the property taken into
the custody of the court by an appropriate seizure? Is the alleged
owner of the property given adequate notice of the proceedings and suffi-
cient time to prepare for his day in court? Are all necessary parties joined
in the action? If the proper procedure is employed the judgment af-
fecting the res is valid-against the whole world if the proceeding is
strictly in rem, against the parties properly notified if the proceeding is
quasi in rem. It does not matter if the property belongs to a non-
resident of the state, because the proceeding is conceived to be against
the property itself, or his interest in it, and not against him. Difficulties
arise when the property sought to be subjected to a state's jurisdiction
is intangible. Intangible property interests include debts and con-
tractual obligations. These interests constitute an enormous source of
wealth and make up a large fraction of the estates of deceased persons.
They are subject to various forms of taxation, escheat, and other exer-
cises of the sovereign power of the states. Are they also subject to the
in rem jurisdiction of a court?12 In the leading case of Harris v. Balk
3
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the exercise of quasi in
11. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 36 (1942).
12. There is difficulty in ascribing a situs to an intangible. "[U]nder various
circumstances, situs has been found at the residence of the obligor, the residence of
the obligee, the location of a written instrument in which the intangible is incorporated,
or wherever the obligor was present; and some decisions have refused to discuss the
situs at all and have refused to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of valid personal
service on the persons affected." Note, Jurisdiction: Quasi in Rem: A New Basis for
Jurisdiction Over Intangibles in California, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 637 (1958); see Andrews,
Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.. 241 (1939).
13. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
JURISDICTIONAL REFORMMay 19701
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
rem jurisdiction over an intangible, a debt obligation. Harris, a resident
of North Carolina, owed $180 to Balk, also a resident of North Carolina.
Balk owed a sum of money to Ebstein, a resident of Maryland. When
Harris was temporarily in Maryland, Epstein had Harris served with a
garinshee summons which attached the debt he owed to Balk, and the
Maryland court applied it in partial satisfaction of the debt which Balk
owed Epstein. Later, when Balk sued Harris in North Carolina, Harris
pleaded the Maryland judgment as a bar. The North Carolina court
disallowed the plea on the theory that the situs of the debt was in North
Carolina and hence the Maryland court had no power to attach it. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that for the pur-
poses of quasi in rem jurisdiction, the situs of the debt follows the
debtor. Said the court:
The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accom-
panies him wherever he goes. . . . It is not a question of pos-
session in the foreign State, for possession cannot be taken of a
debt or of the obligation to pay it, as tanglible property might be
taken possession of. Notice to the debtor (garnishee) of the
commencement of the suit, and notice not to pay his creditor, is
all that can be given, whether the garnishee be a mere casual
and temporary comer, or a resident of the State where the attach-
ment is laid. His obligation to pay to his creditor is thereby ar-
rested and a lien created upon the debt itself.14
The doctrine of Harris v. Balk offers an attractive solution to a
creditor whose debtor is beyond the territorial boundaries of the forum
state and thus not subject to its in personam jurisdiction. If he can
find property of the nonresident debtor within the state, whether tan-
gible, real or personal, or intangible, he can proceed against the prop-
erty. If the property is tangible the normal remedy will be by attach-
ment. If the property is intangible the remedy will be by garnisheeing
the debtor's debtor. If, after due seizure and proper notice, as required
by due process, the nonresident fails to appear, then the plaintiff can
move for default judgment and proceed to prove his claim. Once hav-
ing obtained a default judgment, he can ask the court to apply the at-
tached property (or its proceeds after judicial sale) to the payment of
his judgment. Defendant's obligation will be discharged to the extent
of satisfaction by the property; he remains liable for the deficiency,
since the doctrine which precludes the splitting of causes of action does
not apply.15
14. Id. at 222-23.
15. Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266 (1935); Riverview State
Bank v. Dreyer, 188 Kan. 270, 362 P.2d 55 (1961); Oil Well Supply Co. v. Koen, 64
Ohio St. 422, 60 N.E. 603 (1901); Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem
lurisdiction, 76 HALv. L. REv. 303, 315 (1962).
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The nonresident defendant who believes he has a valid defense is
faced with a dilemma-stay out and forfeit the attached property or
come in and defend, thus subjecting himself to the plaintiff's choice of
forum.1 Thus the benefits to the plaintiff in this procedure are two-
fold: He secures a lien on property of the defendant as security for the
payment of a future judgment, and he forces the defendant to submit
to the in personam jurisdiction of the court or forego his defense.
Until very recently an anomalous situation existed in the federal
courts in relation to quasi in rem jurisdiction. As previously noted,
attachment and garnishment are not common law remedies; however,
most, if not all states have enacted statutes providing for them. As to
the federal judicial system, whether Congress has vested the District
Courts with such quasi in rem jurisdiction cannot be answered by a
simple yes or no. In civil cases, the District Courts of the United
States exercise two types of jurisdiction-original jurisdiction (in which
the case is originally brought in the federal court)17 and removal juris-
diction (in which the case is originally brought in a state court but is
removed to a federal court).18  The original jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts was established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, which vested
them with jurisdiction "of all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity." 9  There was no grant of power to exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction, nor have later acts of Congress added it. Consequently,
it has been held that the lower federal courts possessed no such power.20
The situation has been different, however, with cases originally brought
in a state court and removed to a federal court. The same Judiciary
Act which defined original jurisdiction also established removal juris-
diction and provided specifically that
any attachment of the goods or estate of the defendant by the
original process, shall hold the goods or estate so attached, to
16. There is a possibility that the defendant could specially appear to protect his
property without subjecting himself to complete in personam jurisdiction. Salmon
Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1922); Cheshire
Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916). But see United States v.
Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1956). However, if the defendant chooses
to defend in the first forum and subsequently loses, the issue of liability on the princi-
pal claim may be held to be res judicata in a later suit for a deficiency. Harnischfeger
Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-61 (1964).
18. Id. §§ 1441-50.
19. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78.
20. Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U.S. 31 (1913); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 300 (1838); Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1944);
Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828); Hollingsworth v.
Adams, 12 F. Cas. 348 (No. 6611) (C.C.D. Pa. 1798).
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answer the final judgment in the same manner as by the laws of
such state they would have been holden to answer final judgment,
had it been rendered by the court in which the suit commenced. 2
1
This anomalous situation in the federal courts continued to exist
until 1963 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended
to provide for attachment and garnishment in cases originally brought
in the federal courts. The change was brought about largely due to
the influence of a brilliant article by Professor Brainerd Currie who
argued that the anomaly was due to two "unfortunate" and erroneous
decisions of the Supreme Court.22 He argued that this historical error
could be corrected by an amendment to the rules. This article drew
fire from Professor Paul Carrington who countered that quasi in rem
jurisdiction was on its way out anyway, because of the great expansion
of in personam jurisdiction. He argued that quasi in rem jurisdiction
was unfair to defendants, and that amending the rules to provide for it
in original jurisdiction cases would perpetuate an anachronism.' Some
question was raised by others as to whether an amendment to rules of
procedure would be sufficient to effect the change, 2" especially in view
of the limiting language in the Congressional enabling act 25 and Rule
82, which states: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts or the venue of
actions therein." The Supreme Court was apparently persuaded by
Currie, since it approved an amendment to Rule 4 making attachment
and garnishment available in a federal court if it was available by
"a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held.12 6  And thus ended the anomaly.
27
21. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79-80 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1450
(1964)).
22. Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REV.
337 (1961).
23. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 303 (1962).
24. Elliott & Green, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction in Federal Courts: The Proposed
Amendments to Rule 4, 48 IowA L. Ray. 300 (1963).
25. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1964).
26. FaD. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
27. It is conceivable, but unlikely, that the quasi in rem jurisdiction sought to
be conferred by Rule 4(e) may later be held to be beyond the rule-making power of
the Court. The act of Congress which granted the rule-making power to the court
restricted it to "the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The argument would be that only Congress
may legislate as to the jurisdiction of the courts, or on matters of substance. The fact
that the amendments to the Rule theoretically were submitted to the scrutiny of
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The Trend-In Personam
Against this background, what is the impact of the expanded in
personam jurisdiction on quasi in rem jurisdiction? Is Professor Car-
rington correct when he says: "In the light of the emerging concept
of personal jurisdiction, the quasi in rem procedure is rarely useful to
plaintiffs except in cases which the defendant ought not to be asked to
defend in the forum chosen by the plaintiff. '28  In order to answer
this question we must briefly trace this "emerging concept of personal
jurisdiction."
We begin with Pennoyer v. Neff,29 the leading case on the subject
in this country, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1877.
It is the benchmark from which development is measured. In that case
Mr. Justice Field, writing for the court, said there were two well-settled
principles of public law:
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory. . . . [and] no State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory.30
These principles reflect the "physical power" or "territorial" theory
of jurisdiction. They constituted part of this country's heritage from
England. Whatever the shortcomings of these principles, they had the
charm of simplicity and applied to persons and property alike. Both
were visible and obvious and could be physically seized. As a matter of
fact, historically, seizure was the proper way to commence a civil action.
The suit was started by arresting the defendant under a writ of capias
ad respondendum.31 To find out whether the court had jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, one looked in the dungeon; if he was
there, the court had jurisdiction. At a later stage of the common law,
when judicial sensibilities were honed to a finer sensitivity, this harsh
Congress before they became effective does not make them legislative acts. For exam-
ple, in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), Rule 35 (dealing with physical
examinations) was attacked as ultra vires; the Rule was upheld in a 5-4 decision. In
his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed: "[Llittle significance attaches
to the fact that the Rules, in accordance with the statute, remained on the table of
two Houses of Congress without evoking any objection to Rule 35 and thereby auto-
matically came into force. Plainly the rules are not acts of Congress and cannot be
treated as such." Id. at 18.
28. Carrington, supra note 22, at 306.
29. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
30. Id. at 722.
31. W. BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (1955); F. JAMES, CIVIL PRO.
cEauRE 621 (1965); Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in Conflict of Laws--Some
Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. PuB. L. 313
(1960).
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method gave way to the more humane device of merely serving the
defendant with a summons. The change in method, however, did not
invalidate the physical power theory. The defendant was found within
the territory, and the state could have exerted its power by arresting
him, if it chose to do so. The extreme method of arrest is, of course,
still the usual method of acquiring in personam jurisdiction over a de-
fendant in a criminal action.
Pennoyer involved the problem of securing jurisdiction over a non-
resident. The court held that no jurisdiction was obtained. The hold-
ing was not based, however, on his status as nonresident. It was based
upon the fact that he was not personally served while he was within
the territorial boundaries of the state. It was assumed that such serv-
ice would have conferred jurisdiction, no matter how transient that
presence happened to be.32 This, of course, was in accord with the
physical power theory. In the years since Pennoyer the recurring
problem has been: Under what circumstances may a state subject an
absent defendant to its in personam jurisdiction?
One of the primary purposes of serving the defendant with process
was to order him to appear in court. If he came without compulsion,
so much the better. Consequently, voluntary appearance has long been
regarded as a satisfactory basis for in personam jurisdiction.33 The
principal questions that have arisen have been whether or not a de-
fendant could make a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of
the court without submitting to it, and whether, if overruled, he could
proceed to litigate on the merits without thereby waiving his special
appearance.34
Closely akin to appearance as a basis for jurisdiction is consent.
3 5
Indeed, a general appearance is regarded as a consent to the exercise of
jurisdiction. But other forms of consent are also regarded as ade-
quate bases for jurisdiction. It is not uncommon for contracts to con-
tain clauses by which the parties agree in advance that they consent to
32. Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding service
in plane while defendant was passing over state); Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67
Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895) (service on an alien transiently stopping at a hotel); Dar-
rah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1872) (presence in state only two or three hours during
which service was made); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870) (service on
defendant while on board a steamer in harbor).
33. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 33 (Proposed Official Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as SECOND RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS].
34. See Sunderland, Preserving a Special Appearance, 9 MICH. L. REV. 396
(1911).
35. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 32.
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the jurisdiction of the courts of a particular state in regard to litigation re-
garding the contract.3 6 One problem is whether there has been a true
consent. There is a growing tendency in favor of the proposition that
no true consent exists if the contract is an adhesion contract.
3 7
A significant expansion of in personam jurisdiction occurred when
the United States Supreme Court sanctioned domicile as a sufficient
basis for exercising judicial power over an individual. A Wyoming
court had entered a default judgment against a defendant who was
domiciled in Wyoming but who was served with process in Colorado.
Later a Colorado court refused to recognize the judgment, but the Su-
preme Court reversed on certiorari, holding that
[d]omicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent de-
fendant within reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a
personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.38
California has pushed the domicile concept a little further in the
case of Allen v. Superior Court.3 9 In that case the defendant was dom-
iciled in the state when the suit was filed but had changed his domicile
to another state where he was personally served. It was held that the
court acquired jurisdiction. The new Restatement pushes the concept
still further and makes mere residence a basis. It says:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual
who is a resident of the state unless the individual's relationship
to the state is so attenuated as to make the exercise of such juris-
diction unreasonable. 40
The above bases of jurisdiction may be regarded as traditional.
The real expansion may be said to have begun in the case of Hess v.
Pawloski,41 decided by the Supreme Court in 1927, which upheld as
constitutional the Massachusetts nonresident motorist statute. The case
had a wide popular appeal because it furnished a local forum to a local
plaintiff who was injured by a nonresident motorist. Many states fol-
36. See Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 126 (1961); Schuchmann, Confession
of Judgment as a Conflict of Laws Problem, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 461 (1961).
37. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 318, 333 (1964)
(dissenting opinions); Seigelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 199 (2d
Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting).
38. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
39. 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953); see Note, Jurisdiction and the Nomadic
Resident, 5 HASTiNGs LJ. 191 (1954).
40. SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 30 (1967). For a discussion of the
distinction between residence and domicile, see Beale, Residence and Domicil, 4 IowA
L. BULL. 3 (1918); Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. Rnv.
561 (1953); 34 COLUM. L. Rav. 1556 (1934).
41. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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lowed suit and passed statutes patterned after the Massachusetts law.
42
Indeed, some states expanded the idea to cover nonresident boat owners
and nonresident airplane owners.43 The theoretical basis of the ex-
panded jurisdiction, according to the reasoning in the Hess case, was
that by driving the car in the state the nonresident motorist impliedly
consented to the court's jurisdiction over him. The fictional consent
theory, however, did not accord with the actual facts. The real basis
of the decision is the police power-the power of a state to make rea-
sonable regulations of potentially dangerous or harmful activities. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, in a later case:
In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in the cases does not rest
on consent at all. . . . The potentialities of damage by a motorist,
in a population as mobile as ours, are such that those whom he
injures must have opportunities of redress against him provided
only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend himself.
44
A line of cases is like a mountain stream. It ambles and wanders,
but it gains in strength and volume as it flows along. And it may join
forces with another stream. That is what happened when Hess joined
up with International Shoe.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington45 was a corporation case,
and it blazed a new trail in the quest for a better rationalization for a
state to exert in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The
early view regarded corporations as creatures of the state that created
them, having no legal existence outside of that state, and consequently
not subject to suit elsewhere.46 When, in an expanding economy, it
became clear that corporations were in fact carrying on their activities
in many states the courts sought theoretical justification for subjecting
"foreign" corporations to the jurisdiction of the states in which they op-
erated. In so doing they utilized, at different times, various rationaliza-
42. See generally Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-resident Motorists, 32
MICH. L. REV. 325 (1934); Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-resident
Motorists, 37 MICH. L. REV. 58 (1938); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-resident
Motorists, 39 H~Av. L. REV. 563 (1926); Scott, Hess and Pawloski Carry On, 64
HARV. L. REV. 98 (1950).
43. See Tardiff v. Bank Line, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. La. 1954); Note,
Constitutional Aspects of a Statute Imposing In Personam Jurisdiction Over a Foreign
Corporation Operating Aircraft Within a State, 41 IOWA L. REV. 662 (1956); Note,
Recent Legislation Asserting Jurisdiction Over Non-resident Tort-Feasors, 54 MICH. L.
REV. 1026 (1956); Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Aircraft Operators by Substi-
tuted Service of Process, 29 NOTRE DAME LAW. 640 (1954).
44. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
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tions. 47  One line of cases held that when a foreign corporation was in
fact doing business in another state, it was present in that state and
thus amenable to its jurisdiction.48 Another line of cases justified the
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations on the theory that the
corporation had consented to be sued away from home.49  In some
cases there was indeed a consent. In these situations the foreign corpo-
ration had appointed a local agent upon whom process could be served
in return for the privilege of doing business within the state. In others
the consent was fictional. In these cases the corporation had not
complied with a local statute requiring appointment of a local agent.
These statutes would normally contain a clause that a noncomplying
corporation doing business in the state would be deemed to have ap-
pointed the secretary of state as its agent for service of process. Other
courts, less conscious of the need for theoretical justification, held that
doing business was in itself a sufficient basis for the exercise of in per-
sonata jurisdiction. 50 It was against this background that the Supreme
Court, in 1945, decided the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton.51 The question before the Court was one of due process. Had the
State of Washington violated the foreign corporation's constitutional
rights by exercising in personam jurisdiction over it? The Court did not
resort to any of the older theories to answer the question. It announced
a new test which has since become famous. The case dealt with a foreign
corporation, but the Court, in articulating the new test, spoke not
in terms of corporations, but in terms of defendants. It said that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."
52
The trend which began with Hess was quickened by International
Shoe. One state after another began to enact so-called "long-arm"
statutes. Illinois was the first, in 1955. It provided that a nonresident
would be subject to the in personam jurisdiction of its courts as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
47. The various theories antedating International Shoe are examined in R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CoNFLicTs LAW 56-58 (1968).
48. E.g., Barrow S.S. Line v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
49. E.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
50. See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 47, at 57-58.
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. id. at 316.
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(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated
in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this State. .... 53
New York patterned its statute after Illinois. 54 The Montana stat-
ute55 is more explicit than those of Illinois and New York, and the
Wisconsin statute 6 is even more detailed. It is believed, however, that
no state has exceeded the sweeping simplicity found in the new Cali-
fornia law.
The primary purpose of these statutes is to provide local forums
for local plaintiffs on locally generated causes of actions. International
Shoe authorizes such actions if the minimum contacts of the nonresi-
dent defendant with the forum state are such that the exercise of juris-
diction does not offend our traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. How minimum may these contacts be without being
constitutionally offensive? The Supreme Court has held that the mak-
ing of one contract may be enough, if the cause of action grows out of
that contract.5 7 It has also held that the commission of one tortious
act within the state may be enough if the cause of action arises from
the tort.55 Suppose a tortious act in one state causes injury in the forum
state. In one such case, Gray v. American Radiator Co. & Standard
Sanitary Corp.,59 an Ohio corporation (Titan) manufactured valves which
it sold to a Pennsylvania corporation (American Radiator) which in-
corporated them into furnaces that it manufactured. One of the fur-
naces was sold to the plaintiff in Illinois. It exploded and injured him
and he sued both companies in an Illinois court, seeking to obtain juris-
diction by virtue of the long-arm statute. No point was made in re-
gard to the Illinois contacts of American Radiator, which were appar-
ently substantial. Titan, however, argued that even if the defective
valves had been negligently produced, the "tortious act" would have
occurred in Ohio, not within Illinois so as to subject Titan to that
state's long-arm statute. The Illinois Supreme Court held, however,
that for the purposes of the statute, a "tortious act" is committed where
the resultant damage occurs. Finding no constitutional impediment,
the court upheld jurisdiction. On substantially similar facts, the New
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
54. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1963).
55. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. Rule 4 (1947).
56. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1969).
57. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
58. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
59. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). For a similar case, see Hoagland v.
Springer, 75 N.J. Super. 560, 183 A.2d 678 (App. Div. 1962).
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York Court of Appeals refused to give a similar interpretation to its
long-arm statute and intimated that such a liberal construction would
present constitutional questions.6 0
As of today, the outer constitutional limits of the jurisdictional ef-
ficacy of the long-arm statutes have not been precisely defined.
61
There is enough case law on the shelves, however, to indicate that if
the Gray situation were to reach the Supreme Court, it would sanction
the expanded jurisdiction. That result would seem to mean the end
of the territorial or physical power theory as far as in personam jurisdic-
tion is concerned. 62  In its stead we have the fair play and substantial
justice rubric of the minimum contacts theory which presupposes a bal-
ancing of inconveniences. Is it more fair to require the defendant to
defend away from home than to require the plaintiff to sue away
from home?
3
Physical Power and In Rem Jurisdiction
No development of comparable magnitude has as yet occurred in
the area of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. As late as 1958, the
Supreme Court indicated that Pennoyer v. Neff is still good law as far
as in rem jurisdiction is concerned. The Court said:
Founded on physical power. . . the in rem jurisdiction of a state
court is limited by the extent of its power and by the coordinate
authority of sister States ...
60. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
61. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 397 (1969); Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 532
(1969); Annot., 19 A.LR.3d 171 (1968); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 138 (1968).
62. The scope of long-arm jurisdiction came up in the recent case of Duple
Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969). In that case, a
passenger sued in Hawaii for injuries he received in a bus accident. One of the de-
fendants was a British corporation that had made bus bodies which it sold to an-
other British corporation which in turn filled the Hawaiian order for the buses. In
upholding jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit stated: "In our judgment, the presence of
[the corporation's] coach bodies in Hawaii, brought about by [its] sale to Vauxhall
with knowledge that the product was destined for Hawaii, was sufficient contact with
Hawaii to meet the requirements of due process." Id. at 235. This was challenged
in a dissenting opinion, which stated, in part: "The extension of Hawaii's 'long-arm'
statute so that it stretches halfway around the world to grab the alien appellant brings
to mind a caricature of Blind Justice with arms of rubber!" Id. at 236.
63. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1969), a products liability case similar to Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., upholding jurisdiction over the foreign corporation under sec-
tion 411(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to corporations "doing business in
this state." The court said that if the constitutional requirements are met, then the
question is one of balancing conveniences to the parties. "A balancing of inconveni-
ence to the defendant against the interests of the state and the plaintiff in having the
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. . .The fact that the owner is or was domiciled within the
forum State is not a sufficient affiliation with the property upon
which to base jurisdiction in rem.
64
There have, however, been developments. As the courts have
tended increasingly to soften or dissolve the territorial restrictions of in
personam jurisdiction, they have, perhaps as a counter-protective meas-
ure, tended to impose higher standards on the character of notice to the
defendant. 5 This tendency has been carried over into the area of in
rem jurisdiction. At the time Pennoyer was decided it was regarded
as hornbook law that mere notice by publication was sufficient to sup-
port an in rem judgment. The theory was that the court acquired juris-
diction by the seizure of the property, and that the seizure was itself
a form of notice. Mr. Justice Field stated:
The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its
owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory
that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is taken into the
custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings
authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale
... .In other words, such service may answer in all actions which
are substantially proceedings in rem.66
Seventy-three years later, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
present litigation in California strongly favors the local jurisdiction." Id. at 947, 458
P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
64. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 249 (1958). Insofar as tangible real
or personal property is concerned it is difficult to find any case authority which is not
strictly in harmony with the territorial theory of jurisdiction. The cases are clear that
if the res is within the territorial bounds of the forum state that jurisdiction over it may
be exercised, notwithstanding that the owner may be a nonresident. However, if the
property is beyond the territorial bounds of the forum state no jurisdiction may be exer-
cised over it, notwithstanding that the owner may be a resident of the forum state. SEC-
OND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS §§ 59-60. What if the res, a tangible chattel, has
been surreptitiously or fraudulently removed from the state, or is out of the state only
temporarily? As to this situation, Professor Leflar says: "In all such cases, the tech-
nicality of location at a given moment should be of secondary importance. Of first
importance should be a fair determination of whether the chattel is so connected with
the forum state that it is reasonable to subject the defendant's interest in it to the type
of proceeding that is directed against it there." R. LEFLAR, supra note 47, at 41
(1968). The only case he cites is North Carolina Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyer, 191
F. 552 (6th Cir. 1911), which was a foreclosure action on railroad property which
included, inter alia, a locomotive which was temporarily absent from the state.
65. "As we noted at the outset, the existence of power will not alone suffice to
give jurisdiction. A 'reasonable method of notification' must also be employed and a
'reasonable opportunity to be heard' afforded to persons affected. What is reasonable
for this purpose will vary from situation to situation but an over-all trend may perhaps
be seen toward more careful scrutiny of notice as the insistence on power becomes
more and more attenuated." F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 649-50 (1965).
66. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878).
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Trust Co.,67 Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, further ex-
plained the traditional view in these words:
The ways of an owner with tangible property are such that he
usually arranges means to learn of any direct attack upon his pos-
sessory or proprietary rights. Hence, libel of a ship, attachment
of a chattel or entry upon real estate in the name of law may rea-.
sonably be expected to come promptly to the owner's atten-
tion. . . .A state may indulge the assumption that one who has
left tangible property in the state either has abandoned it, in which
case proceedings against it deprive him of nothing . . . or that he
has left some caretaker under a duty to let him know that it is
being jeopardized.
68
Mr. Justice Jackson refused to be bound by this tradition. He
avoided it first by declining to decide whether the proceeding before
him was in personam or in rem. He thus contributed to the growing
modem tendency to blur the line which is supposed to separate
these historical categories. In the second place, he took a realistic look
at notice by publication and found that it was not "a reliable means of
acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the
courts." 9  While publication was not outlawed for all purposes, the
Justice felt that for certain classes of parties mere notice by publication
fell short of the due process required by the fourteenth amendment.
But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture
is not due process. The means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it.7
°
If Mullane contained a built-in ambiguity because it expressly
refused to characterize the proceeding as in rem or in personam, that
ambiguity was speedily resolved. In two subsequent condemnation
cases (unquestionably in rem), the Supreme Court vacated judgments
resting on notice by publication on the ground that it fell short of the
requirements of due process.7 '
The stricter notice requirements of Mullane do not necessarily
mean a restriction of the utility of in rem remedies, but rather a better
67. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
68. Id. at 316.
69. Id. at 315.
70. Id. The position of Mr. Justice Jackson in Mullane was foreshadowed by Mr.
Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917), when he said: "To dis-
pense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant
is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done." Id. at 92.
Mr. Justice Holmes used such phrases as "natural justice" and "fair play" which later
found their way into the famous formula of International Shoe.
71. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); see 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1957).
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guarantee of the fair play and substantial justice prescribed by Inter-
national Shoe. A recent case decided by the Supreme Court may,
however, result in a serious curtailment of the utility of prejudgment
garnishment. 72 The case involved the practice, under the Wisconsin
statute, of beginning a quasi in rem action by the garnishment of the
defendant's salary by serving his employer with a writ. Mr. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Court, held the practice unconstitutional
as a contravention of due process. He said that a wage earner cannot
be deprived of the use of his wages by garnishment without adequate
notice and an opportunity for a prior hearing. The opinion adverts
to the possible social abuses of such laws, for example, giving the
creditor unconscionable leverage, endangering jobs, and forcing im-
pecunious people "to the wall." Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, suggests
that the Court is acting as a super-legislature because it disagrees with
the policy of such laws. One of the advantages of prejudgment gar-
nishment, and a very important one from the standpoint of the creditor,
is that by its use the creditor can "tie up" the wages, debts, or assets
of the defendant during the pendency of the suit and thus (a) prevent
him from placing them beyond the reach of execution, and (b) secure
a lien on the funds or assets as a guarantee of payment of the judgment
later to be secured. If the Douglas opinion is given a broad interpre-
tation, these advantages will be lost. It may be, however, that a state
can preserve these advantages to a degree by amending its statutes to
restrict the grounds of garnishment and attachment to situations in
which it is reasonable to permit ex parte prejudgment seizure.
The developments which we have been discussing in the last few
pages have been changes in the law sanctioned by the Supreme Court
of the United States. There has been a further development, on the
state-court level, which could have seismic consequences. It involves a
substantial expansion of the concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction, and
it stems from the New York case of Seider v. Roth.73 The facts were
simple. A Canadian by the name of Lemiux took out an ordinary
automobile insurance policy with the Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company. The policy was written in Canada, but Hartford also does
business in New York. The plaintiffs, who were residents of New
York, were injured in Vermont in an accident which they allege was
caused by the negligence of Lemiux. They brought suit in New York,
served Lemiux personally in Canada, and "attached" the "debt" which
Hartford allegedly owed Lemius by having Hartford served in New
72. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Co., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
73. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 264 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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York with a garnishee summons. The question, of course, was whether
the doctrine of Harris v. Balk74 covered the situation. This depended
upon whether the "debt" which Hartford "owed" Lemiux could be
characterized as property belonging to Lemiux which was "found"
in New York. This in turn depended upon what sort of an obliga-
tion Hartford had assumed when it issued its policy to Lemiux. Hart-
ford argued that no attachable debt was created-that the liability
it assumed was conditional and limited and dependent upon future con-
tingencies. The policy, it maintained, was one to indemnify the
insured within the limits of the policy, but only for any judgment
which was rendered against him. This agreement, it contended, was
not a debt in the sense of Harris v. Balk. The plaintiffs, on the
other hand, contended that the obligation to defend, which was as-
sumed under the policy, was such an obligation that it could be en-
forced wherever the insurer could be found. A divided New York
Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs. In answer to the argu-
ment that to so hold would in effect be to create a "direct action stat-
ute" the court said:
That is true to the extent only that affirmance will put jurisdiction
in New York State and require the insurer to defend here, not
because a debt owing by it to the defendant has been attached but
because by its policy it has agreed to defend in any place where
jurisdiction is obtained against its insured. Jurisdiction is properly
acquired by this attachment since the policy obligation is a debt
owed to the defendant by the insurer the latter being regarded as
a resident of this State. .... 75
The point came up before the New York Court of Appeals again
in Simpson v. Loehmann. 6 In that case the plaintiff, a New York
resident, was injured in Connecticut and sued in New York, seeking
to gain jurisdiction by garnisheeing the insurance carrier of the de-
fendant. The court was asked to reconsider Seider, which it did. It
refused to overrule it. Chief Judge Fuld, in the principal opinion, dis-
posed of three constitutional objections as without merit and then pro-
ceeded to reaffirm the rationale of Seider. Judge Keating filed a sep-
arate concurring opinion, expressing his view that the insurance
company was the real party in interest and that Seider represents a
recognition of realities rather than fictions. Judge Breitel concurred,
but "only on constraint of Seider. '77  Two passages illustrate his view
and are worthy of quotation. In the first he says:
74. 198 U.S. 215 (1905); see text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
75. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
76. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
77. Id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
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It is the most tenuous of nominalist thinking that accords the status
of an asset, leviable and attachable, to a contingent liability to
defend and indemnify under a public liability insurance policy.
78
In the second he states:
As for the effect of the rule, the practical consequences are highly
undesirable. This State, and particularly its chief city, is the mecca
for those seeking high verdicts in personal injury cases. On the
basis of the rule in the Seider case, it will be the rare plaintiff who
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of New York courts, even though
only quasi in rem, since it will be a very small insurance com-
pany that does not have a palpable contact with this State. 9
Seider and Simpson, taken together, certainly seemed to settle the
law on the point, at least for the State of New York. But there was
another facet to the problem. Was the quasi in rem jurisdiction ob-
tained over the garnishee insurance company such as to "offend our
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" under the rule
of International Shoe? An answer appeared shortly in Podoisky v. De-
vinney.1s  The factual pattern was the same as Seider and Simpson-
a New York court seeking to obtain jurisdiction by garnisheeing an
insurance company that insured an out-of-state motorist involved in an
out-of-state accident. But, in this case, the suit was removed to the
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. In its scholarly
opinion the court stated that under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins8' it
would be obliged to follow the New York cases were it not for the fact
that to do so would result in an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process of law. It challenged the reasoning of Seider and
Simpson that the obligation of the insurance company under its policy
was a simple debt within the meaning of Harris v. Balk. On the con-
trary, the obligation was a highly complex one, and one which by its
nature was not subject to attachment. More specifically, the court
stated:
Although the duty to defend is unquestionably a benefit accruing
to an insured by reason of a liability insurance contract, this duty
cannot arise until jurisdiction is obtained over the insured. Nor
can the obligation to indemnify arise until a judgment has been
entered against the insured.8
2
Moreover, said the court, the nexus of the litigation with the State
78. Id.
79. Id. at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641; see LaBrum, The Fruits
of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J.
747 (1968).
80. 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
81. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82. 281 F. Supp. at 494.
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of New York was too slight. Near the end of the opinion the court
made this statement:
We do not lightly determine to put aside a procedure passed on
and approved by the New York Court of Appeals on two occa-
sions. However, although the Court of Appeals sought only to
protect its citizens, in our view it cannot do so at the expense of
residents of a foreign forum whose only connection with this forum
is the happenstance of their injuring a New York resident.8 3
The scene shifts to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Curiously, it is not an appeal from the Podolsky case,
but from another United States District Court case which upheld the
constitutionality of the Seider procedure. The case was Minichiello v.
Rosenberg.84  The fact pattern was the same-New York seeking to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over the "debt" owed by the insurance
company. In Minichiello, after removal to the federal court, the
district judge denied a motion to dismiss, and an interlocutory appeal
was perfected under section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code.85 The case
was first heard before a traditional three judge panel, which by a 2-1
vote, upheld the district judge and the Seider procedure. Judge
Friendly's majority opinion reasoned that the New York court regarded
Seider "as in effect a judicially created direct action statute"; s that in
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,87 the United States
Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of direct action statutes
as applied to plaintiffs in the state of the injury; and that
all things considered, the Supreme Court would sustain the validity
of a state statute permitting direct actions against insurers doing
business in the state in favor of residents as well as on behalf of
persons injured within it . . . .The state's interest in protecting
its residents is as great as in the case of nonresidents injured within
the state.88
Judge Anderson's dissent stated that Watson did not cover the
situation. He saw the accident state as having much greater interests
than the state of the plaintiff's residence. An en banc rehearing re-
sulted in a 6-3 affirmance. A supplemental majority opinion addressed
itself to the "hardship argument," which it found unpersuasive "so
83. Id. at 500.
84. 410 F.2d 106 (1969).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) provides for a discretionary appeal where the
trial judge certifies the point involves "a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation ....
86. 410 F.2d at 109.
87. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
88. 410 F.2d at 110.
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long as Harris v. Balk . . . stands." 9  The dissenting opinion dis-
tinguished Harris v. Balk on two grounds: (1) It involved a simple
debt, not a complex "package of rights and duties,"90 and (2) in Harris
the garnishee was a natural person who could be physically present in
only one state at a time; "therefore, although the situs of the debt might
change, there could never exist more than one quasi in rem jurisdic-
tional situs at any given time." 91
The latest case in this series is Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.,
92
another diversity case again coming up from the Southern District of
New York. Again we have the Seider pattern, slightly modified. The
case involved an airplane crash in North Carolina. There were two
nonresident defendants over whom in personam jurisdiction could not
be obtained. Quasi in rem jurisdiction was attempted by attaching the
"debts" owed by their insurance carriers. The plaintiffs in the case
were New York citizens who had been appointed administrators of the
estates of 13 passengers killed in the crash. These passengers, how-
ever, were all residents of states other than New York. The District
Court granted a motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
In the opening sentence of the opinion, Judge Friendly asserted:
These appeals are the latest fallout to reach this court from the
much criticized decision in Seider v. Roth . . . which we have
recently declined to declare unconstitutional on the facts presented
in Minichiello . . .93
The court declined to reach the constitutional issue because it
thought the New York courts would restrict the Seider doctrine to
cases involving New York plaintiffs. Said the court:
A court that could perform the "miracle" on CPLR 320(c) that
was effected in the opinion denying reargument in Simpson . . .
would scarcely shrink from the easier task of saying that a liability
insurance policy was a "debt" only when the plaintiff was a resi-
dent or was suing for a New York accident. This would be par-
ticularly true if the Court of Appeals considered that such a
restrictive construction was needed to save Seider from unconsti-
tutionality or even from serious constitutional doubt. 94
As to that constitutional doubt the court had this to say:
The constitutional doubt arises from New York's lack of meaning-
ful contact with the claim; a court of another state cannot supply
this by picking a New Yorker as administrator of the estate of a
non-resident who suffered fatal injury.95
89. Id. at 118.
90. Id. at 121.
91. Id. For comments on Minichiello see 55 A.B.A.J. 365, 686 (1969).
92. 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969).
93. Id. at 813.
94. Id. at 817.
95. ld.
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Conclusion
The thesis of this paper is that California adopted a national trend
by adding to its Code of Civil Procedure a clause automatically ex-
panding the jurisdiction of its courts to the full limit of constitutional
permissibility. We have examined that trend. Our remaining task is
to make explicit exactly what it means to California.
Initially, and of primary importance, California now has unlimited
long-arm powers, which was not true before the amendment. It now
has a statute subjecting individual defendants to long-arm jurisdiction.
Prior to the 1969 amendment, California had restricted long-arm juris-
diction to two types of cases: (a) suits against foreign corporations,
and (b) actions under the nonresident motorist statute. The former
was expounded in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 6 which
became one of the important trend cases applying the minimum con-
tacts theory. The lack of a general long-arm statute applicable to indi-
vidual defendants induced the California Supreme Court into in rem
analysis of the problem in another case, Atkinson v. Superior Court.97
96. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). This was a suit in California on a life insurance policy.
The defendant insurance company, a foreign corporation, had taken over the business
of a former company. It issued a new policy which was delivered in California and
premiums were paid by mail from California. The defendant had no office or agent in
California, and was served by registered mail. The California courts gave judgment
for the plaintiff, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. After
referring to International Shoe, it said "[ilt is sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection" with California.
Id. at 223.
97. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957). In this case employees who were
members of a union sued to set aside a collective bargaining agreement under which
payroll deductions from their salaries were to be sent to a New York trustee. The
plaintiffs maintained that the trust was not for a proper purpose and sought to have it
expunged from the contract. No in personam jurisdiction could be obtained over the
trustee. Jurisdiction was upheld, however, on the theory that there was quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Justice Traynor's opinion for the court states: "Plaintiffs claim that the
employers' obligation to make the payments involved is one owing to them instead of
to the trustee. That obligation is a chose in action and is therefore personal property
within the meaning of the statutory provisions." Id. at 342, 316 P.2d at 963.
Traynor later commented on the case and explained that the court was forced to
use the in rem technique because, at that time, there was no law permitting in personam
jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee, "even though there were enough contacts
with the state to justify full in personam jurisdiction" and though "California afforded
an eminently convenient forum." Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TrXAS L. REv. 657, 662, 663 (1959); see Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HAIv. L. Ruv. 303 (1962); Hazard, A General Theory of State-
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966). In Note, Jurisdic-
diction: Quasi in Rem: A New Basis for Jurisdiction Over Intangibles in California,
I
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Under the new law the California courts may now exercise long-arm
jurisdiction over any type of absent defendant in any type of case in
which the contacts of the defendant with the state are such that the
exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "98
Second, assuming minimum contacts, the new statute will reduce
the necessity for utilization of quasi in rem techniques as a means of
forcing a nonresident defendant to come in and defend. However,
the quasi in rem device will still be available if minimum contacts do
not exist. As a matter of fact, if the Seider99 procedure is ultimately
upheld as constitutional, it may develop into a greater jurisdiction-
expander than the long-arm statute.
In the third place, the new statute adopts federal constitutional
trends of the future to guide the jurisdiction of its courts. Some believe
that the International Shoe doctrine, fully developed, will result in the
practical elimination of state lines' and in the disappearance of any
distinction between in personam and in rem jurisdiction.1 1  Others
believe that Hanson v. Denckla0 2 constituted a clear warning by the
46 CALIF. L. REv. 637, 639 (1958), the author makes this statement: "But by abandon-
ing use of a situs to justify quasi in rem jurisdiction and replacing it with a standard
indistinguishable from the rules for personal jurisdiction the court has really raised the
question whether quasi in rem jurisdiction over intangibles ought not simply to be
merged into the expanded modern rules for personal jurisdiction."
98. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
99. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
100. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 77-79 (1962); Ehrenzweig, The Tran-
sient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65
YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
101. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 303 (1963); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr.
REV. 241; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HARV. L. REV. 121 (1966).
102. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). This case is regarded as setting limits on the expansion
of state court jurisdiction under the International Shoe formula. Comprehension of
these limits requires consideration of the facts under review in Hanson. A Mrs.
Donner, while domiciled in Pennsylvania, executed a trust of personal property, naming
a Delaware trustee and reserving a power of appointment. Later she moved to Florida,
where she made her will, in which she exercised the power of appointment. Upon her
death, the Florida probate court refused to recognize the exercise of the power of ap-
pointment and held that the trust property became a part of the residue of her estate.
In Delaware, where the trust was being administered, the courts refused to recognize
the Florida judgment. The Supreme Court faced the full faith and credit issue posed
by the decision. Chief Justice Warren stated the opinion of the Court to be that the
Florida court was without power to affect the trust property. The trust res was in Dela-
ware, thereby eliminating in rem jurisdiction in Florida. No in personam jurisdiction
over the trustee attached for want of the necessary minimum contacts. The Court
rejected the argument that over the years the trustee's correspondence and payments
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Supreme Court that the flexible standard of International Shoe cannot
be pushed too far.103 What will happen to the expanding concept of
state-court jurisdiction cannot be determined at the present time. Anal-
ogous to the development of the Erie principle, 10 4 definition will be on
a case by case basis, probably extending over a period of many years.
Consequently, at this time only an educated guess is possible as to what
California embraced when it tied its jurisdictional statute to the future
development of an area of constitutional law. A trend, by necessity, is
a guess-albeit educated-about the future; it might change direction.
California might be displeased or disappointed at the development.
The state's recourse then would be to cut its tie by repealing the statute.
In the meantime, the outer jurisdictional limits of the California courts
will be determined by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
to Mrs. Donner amounted to minimum contacts. The Chief Justice stated: "The
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that
rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
103. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969); Mini-
chiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinions);
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); O'Brien
v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
104. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), established the principle that,
in a diversity case, a federal court must apply state substantive law. However, it has
taken a long line of cases to define what was meant by state law. E.g., Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Ragan v. Mer-
chants' Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945). The latest case in the series, Hanna v. Plumer, clarifies some
aspects of the problem and sheds doubt upon others. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plu-
mer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965); Stason, Choice of
Law Within the Federal System: Erie v. Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377 (1967).
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